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ABSTRACT 
Techniques are described herein for efficient tunnel management for secured 
communication between Network Functions (NFs) across different Public Land Mobile 
Networks (PLMNs) through Security Edge Protection Proxies (SEPPs). A common 
secured tunnel is created for all the NFs to interact between visited SEPPs (vSEPP) and 
home SEPPs (hSEPPs). There is a choice to select different authentication methods 
between different vSEPP-hSEPP pairs. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
In 5G architecture, a Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) is defined to provide 
topology hiding and message filtering/policing between inter - Public Land Mobile 
Network (PLMN) control plane interfaces. Network Functions (NFs) between different 
PLMNs exchange control plane messages through SEPP. Visited SEPPs (vSEPP) and 
home SEPPs (hSEPPs) use secured tunnels between them. Different types of authentication 
methods are available for securing tunnels between vSEPPs and hSEPPs, and each NF 
interaction can lead to the creation of a new tunnel between SEPPs. This may lead to the 
existence of too many tunnels between SEPPs. Also, supporting different authentication 
methods between different SEPP pairs is challenging in current designs. 
As described herein, Hypertext Transfer Protocol 2 (HTTP/2) header metadata is 
used to exchange bitstrings to understand types of security methods supported and mutually 
agreed based on received responses and lists of preferred headers. Otherwise, a fallback 
option may be employed for static configuration based Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
over HTTP/2. 
Each roaming partner (PLMN) may have a different type of support preference for 
security. There may be a common secured tunnel between a vSEPP-hSEPP pair. Moreover, 
there may be multiple vSEPP-hSEPP pairs, each using different authentication methods. 
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As illustrated in Figure 1 below, the SEPP may advertise the supported authentication 
method(s) to all the peers as part of a bootstrapping procedure. 
 
Each peer SEPP may respond back with the supported authentication method 
during an initial handshake (during bootstrapping). As illustrated in Figure 2 below, once 
a secured tunnel is established between a vSEPP-hSEPP pair, that tunnel can also be used 
for all the NFs control plane interactions between those two PLMNs. 
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When requested to connect to the User Equipment (UE)’s home NF, the visited NF 
may send Service Based Interface (SBI) - defined messages to a Uniform Resource 
Identifier (URI) exposed by the vSEPP. On the other side, one or more of the same type of 
secured connections based on discovery involving HTTP/2 header metadata may be used 
to exchange a list of supported authentication schemes in response to the initial registration 
header list of current authentication schemes at the visited side. 
For each subscriber, the same PLMN visiting area tunnel may be used as streaming. 
The same link may be reused for multiple requests. 
In case of idle connections, a keep-alive scheme may ensure that costly endpoints 
are brought down. Alternatively, multiple connections may be trimmed down to just one 
connection depending on the particular configuration. 
In summary, techniques are described herein for efficient tunnel management for 
secured communication between NFs across different PLMNs through SEPPs. A common 
secured tunnel is created for all the NFs to interact between vSEPP and hSEPPs. There is 
a choice to select different authentication methods between different vSEPP-hSEPP pairs. 
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